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Abstract 
We analyse domestic factors within European donor countries that have influenced their 
provision of budget support. Budget support has been one of the most promising, and at the 
same time, controversial aid instruments aimed at improving aid effectiveness as well as 
donor harmonisation. Based on theoretical considerations, our econometric analysis for the 
2002–2012 period shows that government ideology, the economic context in donor countries, 
as well as the structure of their aid systems have been important determinants of budget sup-
port provision. A comparison of Germany and the United Kingdom sustains these findings 
with qualitative evidence. Our findings also indicate that these ideological, economic and 
bureaucratic factors have worked as important barriers to improved donor harmonisation 
within Europe. 
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Summary 
This paper aims to identify the domestic origins of budget support provision in 15 European 
donors during the 2002–2012 period. Our econometric analysis, supported by two case 
studies of Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), provides evidence that the provision of 
budget support was heavily influenced by government ideology, economic circumstances 
and bureaucratic structures in European donor countries. Our study also contributes to a 
better understanding of the domestic reasons for the continuing collective action problems in 
the EU’s development policy. It strongly suggests that the approach of decentralised 
coordination among European donors has not solved the ongoing effectiveness and 
efficiency problems of European foreign aid. Against this background, we conclude that 
more binding coordination mechanisms – if not further integration of European aid policies 
– are key to securing European influence in a changing international landscape. 
Budget support has been at the centre of discussions on how to make European aid more 
effective and also better harmonised. Budget support consists of direct transfers of financial 
resources to the recipient government’s treasury, aims at aligning itself to the recipient 
country’s policy priorities and uses endogenous budget procedures of the recipient. The 
instrument also has a number of in-built characteristics to better harmonise aid interventions: 
a joint financing mechanism that comes along with joint political dialogues and performance 
assessments. Given its design, budget support was thus expected to counter the criticism of 
traditional project aid, which had increasingly come under fire for producing only meagre 
development results.  
However, this perspective of the potential of budget support was not shared uniformly by 
European governments and aid bureaucracies. Sceptics quickly denounced it as a “blank 
cheque to corrupt regimes” and as an instrument that bears high political and fiduciary risks. 
Some bilateral donor governments were thus more cautious and selective, and highlighted 
the need to tie budget support to strict political conditionality. Others were strong 
supporters, and highlighted the potential of budget support to make aid more effective in 
reducing poverty and refrained from making budget support a political instrument. Thus, 
European donors had different degrees of risk averseness and different preferences 
regarding the provision of budget support. These policy differences became particularly 
apparent in different budget support disbursement and suspension strategies, particularly in 
times of political crisis in recipient countries. Acting in a non-harmonised way, in turn 
undermined the collective influence of European donors and led to inconsistent signals 
being sent to developing country governments. The attempt to use budget support as a 
catalyst for better harmonising the delivery of European foreign aid thus remained well 
below its potential. 
Against this background, we argue that these different preferences of European bilateral 
donors towards the provision of budget support and the different degrees of risk averseness 
have been systematically driven by domestic politics within European donor countries. Our 
econometric analysis of 15 European donor countries in the 2002–2012 period identifies 
three main factors that explain the heterogeneity of budget support disbursements: 
• First, more conservative governments on a left-right scale of politics have disbursed 
significantly less budget support. This finding can be explained by the fact that 
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conservative governments are more risk averse and prefer to have control over their aid 
activities because their constituencies are more sceptical about aid in general and are 
over proportionally concerned about aid being wasted by corrupt recipients. 
• Second, the domestic economic context in European donor countries played a signifi-
cant role in budget support disbursements with lower domestic growth rates having a 
disproportional negative effect on budget support disbursements. Our explanation for 
this finding is that during times of economic crisis it is particularly difficult for donor 
governments to spend aid on less visible and supposedly more risky forms of foreign 
aid. 
• Third, the provision of budget support has been negatively affected by the existence of 
strong implementing aid agencies relying on a project-based model of aid delivery 
because such agencies tend to oppose budget support as a threat to their traditional 
business model. At the same time, aid systems without such structures have found budget 
support an adequate instrument for decreasing disbursement pressure in time of rising aid 
volumes.  
We supplement our econometric analysis by a qualitative comparative case analysis of 
Germany (a rather cautious provider of budget support) and the United Kingdom (a strong 
supporter of budget support). Comparing both cases reveals that the project-based model of 
aid delivery in Germany created strong barriers against the provision of budget support. In 
contrast, in the United Kingdom no such opposition existed, which made it easier to 
disburse increasing amounts of foreign aid as budget support. Moreover, the comparison of 
both countries clearly reveals how the changes in the party composition of government 
affected the provision of budget support. 
Overall, the heterogeneity of using budget support as an aid instrument has therefore not 
been randomly distributed among European governments but was rooted in political, 
economic and bureaucratic interests within European donor countries. As those features 
vary strongly within and between European donor countries, they present serious barriers to 
harmonising aid practices in a decentralised way. Against the evidence presented here, it 
seems questionable whether European donor governments will be able to craft well-
harmonised aid interventions in a decentralised manner. In the case of budget support, or 
what remained of it, delegating more policy and coordination competences to the European 
Commission to manage a truly European approach to the instrument needs to be the way 
forward. European governments face a tough choice: either they abstain from their ambition 
of increasing Europe’s collective action capacity towards the developing world; or they start 
to make serious progress in better harmonising, if not integrating, their bilateral 
development and foreign policies. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, general budget support (GBS) has become one of the most 
prominent but also controversial instruments of foreign aid. Initially provided by the 
World Bank, budget support soon became popular among other multilateral development 
banks, the European Commission and bilateral European donors.1 However, despite 
claims that GBS should develop into donors’ preferred aid modality (see DFID 2004; EC 
2008), the proportion of budget support has remained modest in relation to the overall aid 
portfolio of donors. Moreover, one of the expectations of budget support was that it would 
lead to increased donor harmonisation by pooling resources and coordinating non-financial 
inputs such as policy dialogue and conditionality (de Renzio et al. 2005). Especially among 
European donors, however, a great heterogeneity in budget support policies emerged during 
the 2002–2012 period, with different objectives attached to the instrument, large varieties in 
amounts and recipients of budget support, and different interpretations regarding the extent 
to which budget support should go along with political conditionality. This policy 
heterogeneity, in turn, severely undermined the effectiveness of the instrument and the 
attempts at improved donor harmonisation (e.g. Faust et al. 2012; Molenaers 2012). Against 
this background, we investigate the domestic political origins of this heterogeneity and 
embed our analysis in the current debates around aid effectiveness as well as European 
development and foreign policy. 
From an aid effectiveness perspective, budget support for many seemed the most promising 
aid instrument to implement much-needed reforms for making foreign aid more effective. 
GBS is intended to directly co-finance anti-poverty policies of a recipient government using 
the recipient’s own budgetary and administrative processes. This approach was expected to 
strengthen recipients’ ownership and minimise the administrative burden associated with the 
traditional highly fragmented project approach. To cope with the fiduciary risks entailed in 
the process of directly funding the recipient state’s budget, the provision of financial 
resources has been part of a package of several non-financial components: political and 
economic conditionality; policy dialogue; as well as capacity-building to strengthen public 
financial management systems. By using partner country’s own administrative systems, 
accompanied by the non-financial components, budget support is also expected to contribute 
to institutional reforms (Faust / Leiderer / Schmitt 2012). Even though the in-built charac-
teristics of budget support incentivise donor harmonisation, especially the non-financial 
inputs require additional coordination efforts on the donor side in order to ensure a pre-
dictable flow of funds and a credible set of incentives for the recipient government. 
The latter requirement for improved donor harmonisation seemed to be particularly in line 
with a European perspective. In theory, the joint policy dialogue between European 
bilateral budget support providers (including the European Commission) and the recipient 
government could have functioned as a catalyst for policy convergence through improving 
harmonisation and coordination between actors of European development and foreign 
policy (de Renzio et al. 2005). However, the perception of budget support as an innovative 
                                                 
1  General budget support is different from other forms of budget support such as, for example, sector 
budget support, where funds are earmarked for specific sectors. In this paper, we focus on the use of 
GBS, but use the terms GBS and budget support interchangeably. 
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and effective aid instrument was at the time not shared uniformly by European govern-
ments and aid bureaucracies. 
Sceptical arguments pointed to the high fiduciary risks and the potential risk of strength-
ening authoritarian structures and neo-patrimonial politics by directly co-financing the 
recipient government’s budget (see Barkan et al. 2005). As the broader public in donor 
countries often perceived budget support as an endorsement of the recipient country’s 
political regime, donor governments can be held accountable by their own domestic consti-
tuency as a co-financier of corruption or human rights abuses (e.g. Handley 2009). More-
over, budget support provided less visibility in donor countries than purely bilateral de-
velopment interventions but high visibility in case of suspensions. 
As a result of these arguments in favour and against the use of budget support, the degree to 
which European donor governments engaged in its provision varied strongly. We argue that 
European governments’ preferences for using GBS were not just randomly distributed but 
were influenced by the domestic political context of member states. These political dyna-
mics, in turn, reveal an important factor that accounted for the slow and hesitant implemen-
tation of the aid effectiveness agenda (see Wood et al. 2011). The aid effectiveness 
principles were erroneously considered a political agreement that required smart technical 
ways to be fully implemented; they neglected, however, the political economy of aid donors 
and the domestic political interests and institutional challenges that hindered these principles 
being endorsed entirely. Budget support and the different preferences of European member 
states provide a very interesting case to highlight these political economy factors that 
hindered a more progressive implementation of the aid effectiveness principles. 
We expect three factors of the domestic political context of donor countries to have played a 
key role: i) partisan politics, ii) the economic context and iii) bureaucratic interests. To test 
these claims, we performed an econometric analysis of 15 European donors in the 2002-
2012 period complemented by a small-n comparison of the two largest European donors: 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Our empirical investigation provides strong support for 
these arguments. More conservative governments did disburse less budget support, while 
budget support disbursements were negatively influenced by an unfavourable domestic 
economic context. Moreover, our econometric analysis also revealed the importance of 
constant contextual factors at the country level over the period under investigation. We thus 
performed a case study analysis to, first, trace the impact of partisan politics on the provision 
of GBS, and, second, to zoom in on the impact of the institutional set-up of a donor 
country’s foreign aid system on its preferences for budget support. 
Overall, our analysis contributes to two strands of research. By showing how the 
economic context and the government composition shape the use of a highly political aid 
instrument and undermine efforts for better aid harmonisation, we contribute to the debate 
on how domestic donor politics contribute to limited aid effectiveness. Moreover, our 
findings also link to the literature on a common European development and foreign policy 
as they demonstrate how attempts of external policy convergence were undermined by 
political and bureaucratic considerations of national governments. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 starts by sketching the implementation logic 
of budget support against the background of the aid effectiveness debate. We also 
introduce recent case-study evidence which shows the limits of European donor 
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harmonisation in the implementation process of budget support (2.1). Hereafter, we 
analyse GBS from a political economy perspective and deduce our hypotheses regarding 
the impact of domestic politics on budget support provision (2.2). In Section 3, we present 
our econometric analysis (3.1) and our two case studies of Germany and the United 
Kingdom (3.2). By describing the political processes within each country over time, we 
provide further evidence on how partisan politics have influenced GBS policies. 
Moreover, by comparing the rather time-invariant bureaucratic structures of both countries, 
we point to the importance of these structures for policy preferences regarding the use of 
GBS. The conclusion sums up our results and discusses avenues for further research. 
2 Analytical framework 
2.1 The rise of budget support and its expected benefits 
The rise of budget support at the end of the 1990s has to be understood against the 
background of the mounting criticism of the traditional aid system and subsequent reform 
efforts, which culminated in the 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2008 Accra Agenda for 
Action.2 The reform agenda demanded that donors respect recipient countries’ ownership 
of their own policies, align behind these domestic development objectives, use recipient 
countries’ own administrative systems for channelling aid and harmonise their aid inter-
ventions (OECD 2008). Moreover, the changes envisaged by the aid effectiveness agenda 
not only identified what should be done differently in the future, but also how donors 
should deliver their aid in order to put the principles into practice. 
In this regard, budget support has been considered most apt to implement these aid 
effectiveness principles. According to its design, it promotes harmonisation by pooling 
donor resources and avoids parallel structures by channelling funds directly into a recipient 
government’s budget. To cope with the fiduciary risks entailed in the process of directly 
funding the recipient state’s budget, the provision of GBS has been accompanied by several 
non-financial components: political and economic conditionality; policy dialogue; and tech-
nical assistance to strengthen public financial management systems. In addition, through its 
financial and non-financial components, budget support aims at a combination of financial 
and governance objectives.  
The instrument’s financial objective mainly consists of providing predictable funding for 
the implementation of poverty-reduction policies. In addition, the instrument also aims at 
actively promoting the quality of governance, using the leverage of financial contributions 
to improve public financial management and more transparent, effective and accountable 
state institutions (Faust / Leiderer / Schmitt 2012). In its most ambitious interpretation, 
budget support has also been considered as an instrument for supporting democratic 
                                                 
2  Mounting empirical evidence showed that aid interventions were often too fragmented to establish 
coherent incentive systems and too numerous and scattered to strengthen domestic administrative 
structures. Quite the opposite, the vast number of projects often overburdened already weak 
administrations in developing countries by establishing parallel reporting and management systems. In 
addition, conditionalities have often imposed policy reforms on countries, while neglecting recipients’ 
own development preferences and strategies (see e.g. Collier et al. 1997; Acharya / De Lima / Moore 
2006; Knack / Rahman 2007). 
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accountability and human rights (Hayman 2011; Faust et al. 2012). Thus seen, besides its 
function of providing reliable funding for poverty-reduction strategies, budget support has 
become a potentially powerful instrument for donors to influence domestic political 
decision-making via political dialogue and conditionality. For the different types of 
political conditionality attached to budget support, see Box 1.  
On the positive side, donors hope to provide an incentive for democratic accountability 
and civic participation by making the budget process more transparent. In addition, donors 
also aim at supporting key democratic institutions such as supreme audit institutions, 
political parties, media and civil society organisations with financial and technical 
assistance in order to minimise their own fiduciary risks. 
In addition to having the potential to make aid more effective, budget support could have 
made a contribution to a better coordinated European development policy. Development 
policy is a shared competency within the European Union (EU) leading to continuous 
struggles between the European Commission and member states on how to establish a 
more unified appearance while maintaining national autonomy in policy formulation 
(Carbone 2008; Orbie / Versluys 2008; Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013). Due to its in-
built harmonisation characteristics, budget support was expected to strengthen the 
coordination and harmonisation of European development policy (de Renzio et al. 2005). 
Pooling resources instead of relying on individually managed projects, holding joint 
policy dialogues with recipient governments and jointly agreeing on key reform objectives 
were expected to provide an adequate framework for a well-coordinated appearance of 
European aid donors. Budget support – amongst other initiatives the 2007 Code of 
Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour – was thus seen as a means to 
promote a more coherent European development policy through better coordination and 
harmonisation. 
Box 1: Political conditionalities attached to budget support 
Political conditionality can be attached to budget support at different levels. The first level is the 
eligibility stage: Only those countries that can demonstrate a good track record in democratic governance 
are granted budget support. This selective provision of budget support is meant to be “hands-off” and not 
directly aimed at levering improvements in democratic governance. Once a donor and a recipient country 
agree on the provision of budget support, they integrate underlying principles (UPs) into their 
contractual agreements. These serve as the underlying conditionality for providing budget support and 
typically include i) macro-economic stability, ii) government commitment to implement a national 
development and poverty reduction strategy, iii) commitment to implement reforms in the area of public 
financial management (PFM), and iv) commitment to democratic principles and respect for human rights. 
If one of these UPs is (considered) violated, donors have the option to schedule a political dialogue to 
openly address these issues. They can also withhold, delay or suspend budget support tranches to 
incentivise domestic political change or to signal their disagreement with the current political situation. 
Foreign aid and the domestic politics of European budget support 
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2.2 Critical perspectives on budget support and the reactions of European  
donors 
Even though budget support provided a number of in-built characteristics to make aid 
more effective and to increase donor harmonisation, it never became European 
governments’ preferred aid modality (Warrener 2004; ECA 2010; Molenaers 2012). 
According to the data of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the 
percentage of budget support given by a single bilateral European donor in the 2002-2012 
period remained low. Even the strongest bilateral supporter of the instrument within 
Europe, the United Kingdom, reached a maximum of no more than 15% of overall country 
programmable aid (see Figure 1). Thus, the considerable overall amount of roughly USD 
17 billion disbursed via budget support by the 15 biggest European donors in this period 
has to be put into perspective as it only represented 7% of their overall country 
programmable aid. Partly, this moderate use of GBS can be related to the limited 
absorptive capacity of recipient countries’ administrative structures (Warrener 2004). The 
main reason, however, relates to the high perceived risks associated with the instrument 
that made budget support a highly contested aid instrument. 
From a financial accountability perspective, budget support was perceived as coming 
along with high fiduciary risks, i.e. the risk that aid resources could be used for unintended 
purposes (Koeberle / Stavrevski 2005; Clist / Isopi / Morrissey 2012). Even though other 
forms of foreign aid are arguably similarly fungible resources, budget support fungibility 
is much more apparent since donor funds are merged with recipient government’s own 
budgetary resources and are thus subject to their own national control institutions. The 
instrument has thus been perceived by many donor governments as bearing higher risks 
regarding mismanagement and potential fraud than traditional project aid, for instance 
(Faust / Leiderer / Schmitt 2012). Unlike project aid, the provision of budget support is 
also considered by some as an endorsement of the recipient country’s political regime. 
Figure 1: Average donor share of GBS in overall country programmable aid, 2002–2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author, based on CRS data from the OECD DAC 
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Even if donors provide budget support not only to co-finance poverty reduction but also to 
strengthen institutional quality, corruption scandals, human rights abuses or rigged 
elections might still occur – in particular since most developing countries are hybrid 
regimes with regular political hiccups. In particular in the case of a political crisis, donors 
have been frequently held accountable for having supported these regimes with direct 
budgetary support (Barkan et al. 2005; Dijkstra / de Kemp / Bergkamp 2012). 
Budget support also posed a number of significant challenges from a donor country’s 
political economy perspective. Especially in times of economic crisis and strained donor 
budgets, foreign aid faces legitimacy concerns and increasing pressure to show visible 
developmental results (e.g. Vollmer 2012). Budget support is a particularly tricky 
instrument in this respect. Individual donor contributions are hardly visible given that 
resources are pooled with other donors’ and domestic resources and failure or success 
cannot be attributed to a particular donor intervention. Moreover, the developmental 
results of budget support are fairly long-term and more difficult to communicate to the 
domestic public compared to the short-term successes of earmarked projects (Fölscher / 
Bartholomew / Carter 2008).3 Budget support suspensions, on the other hand, are highly 
visible. If the political situation in an aid-receiving country deteriorates and human rights 
abuses or mismanagement of public funds become public, the pressure on donors to react 
increases. Since budget support has also been provided to authoritarian regimes such as 
Vietnam, Ethiopia or Rwanda and to countries with high levels of corruption, the 
instrument became most prone to be used for aid suspensions and for showing donor’s 
discontent with the current political situation. Thus, withholding or (partly) suspending 
budget support has been used widely to, on the one hand, send a clear signal to domestic 
constituencies that such behaviour will not be tolerated, while on the other hand upholding 
other aid flows to ensure social service delivery and at least partly aid predictability (e.g. 
Molenaers / Cepinskas / Jacobs 2010; Molenaers 2012). 
As a response to these reputational risks associated with budget support, some bilateral 
donors started to attach stronger conditionalities to their budget support policies, and 
became more selective with regard to the minimum requirements a country needs to fulfil 
in order to receive GBS. Initially, budget support was supposed to promote partner 
country ownership, to be more “hands-off“ than previous financing instruments such as 
structural adjustment funding and to primarily fund the poverty reduction ambitions of 
partner countries (Warrener 2004). Given the high fiduciary risks attributed to the 
instrument, and the concerns in donor countries that budget support would strengthen non-
democratic and neopatrimonial structures, this “hands-off“ approach was often difficult to 
sustain. As a consequence, many European bilateral donors attached increasing importance 
to the governance function of the instrument and were more and more inclined to use 
political conditionalities on different levels. 
                                                 
3  The empirical evidence of the developmental results related to budget support is at least modestly 
positive, with country evaluations often showing an increase in pro-poor spending particularly in the 
health and education sector as well as improved allocative efficiency in national budgets (e.g. IDD and 
Associates 2006; Faust / Leiderer / Schmitt 2012; Caputo / Kemp /Lawson 2011). Moreover, prelim-
nary results from cross-country studies reveal that budget support has not been associated with 
crowding out effects of domestic revenue (Knoll 2012) and – at least regarding the World Bank’s 
Poverty Reduction Support Credits – has had a positive impact on aspects of democratic accountability 
(Limpach / Michaelowa 2011). 
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Still, these associated risks (and opportunities of) budget support were handled very 
differently among European bilateral donors. In line with the fact that development policy 
is a parallel competency among European member states, each European donor reserved 
the right to draft its own individual budget support policy including its own handling and 
management of the above mentioned risks. As a result, these policies have differed sub-
stantially with regard to how selective budget support has been given, the extent to which 
budget support has been understood as a mere financing or also as a political instrument, 
and the extent to which budget support suspensions have been used in times of political 
crisis. The differences in those policy aspects are linked to a donor government’s overall 
preference for the instrument, which varied strongly among European donors. This is 
illustrated by the heterogeneity of disbursements shown in Figure 1. 
Putting emphasis on the governance function, for instance, expresses donors’ caution and 
sceptical attitude towards the instrument. In a similar vein, those donors who are highly 
selective and introduce high entry criteria for GBS are also likely to have much lower 
budget support volumes and disbursements. Those who are less selective and use a 
dynamic instead of a minimum requirement approach – that is, an emphasis on progress 
rather than thresholds – are also likely to have higher GBS volumes and thus more support 
for the instrument. Moreover, attaching political conditionalities to the instrument is 
mostly related to a protectionist attitude and the attempt to shield GBS from domestic 
political concerns. These donors are very likely to use budget support as a bargaining chip 
in the case of a political crisis in recipient countries, whereas those who attach no political 
conditionality put emphasis on aid predictability and the use of GBS for public service 
delivery. 
These different European donor policies have led to considerable harmonisation problems 
on the ground.4 As European donors have not subscribed to a joint budget support policy 
and a joint management of political conditionalities, the effectiveness of the instrument 
and the degree of donor harmonisation in a given country context has been seriously 
undermined (Faust / Leiderer / Schmitt 2012; Molenaers 2012). A 2009 corruption scandal 
in the health sector in Zambia is a case in point. When the misappropriation of funds 
became public, Sweden and the Netherlands suspended their budget support disburse-
ments, while the European Commission decided to release additional funds out of its V-
FLEX mechanism, an instrument created to absorb the consequences of the financial 
crisis. These incoherent reactions were the result of different interpretations of the fraud 
case: those who suspended budget support regarded it as a sign for deteriorating gover-
nance and increasing fiduciary risks. Others read it as a sign of progress and strengthened 
national control mechanisms, since the detection and subsequent prosecution of the fraud 
case was initiated by local institutions (Faust/ Leiderer/ Schmitt 2012). 
But even when European donors arrived at similar interpretations of a given event, they 
often did not feel bound to coordinate their reactions. In June 2012, a United Nations (UN) 
                                                 
4  Particularly, empirical evidence on the EU’s neighbourhood policy has revealed that donors need to 
provide strong and credible incentives and highly coordinated interventions for conditionality to be 
effective (Schimmelfennig / Engert / Knobel 2003; Schimmelfennig / Sedelmeier 2004). In contrast, if a 
country receives inconsistent signals or is aware of internal disputes or quarrels among the donor 
institutions, this will clearly undermine the incentives for countries to comply with conditionality 
(Schimmelfennig / Sedelmeier 2004). 
Jörg Faust / Svea Koch 
10 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
report accused the Rwandan government of supporting armed groups operating in the 
Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Consequently European donors, among them 
the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and the European Commission suspended 
or delayed parts or full tranches of their budget support. Instead of coordinating these 
responses, however, they made their choices on an individual basis, in some cases without 
directly informing the Rwandan government. Decisions to reinstall parts of budget support 
were not coordinated either. The United Kingdom, for instance, unblocked half of the 
funds in September 2012 after holding consultations with the Rwandan government, 
before freezing it again in November at the request of its parliament.5 Germany unfroze its 
budget aid to Rwanda in February 20136, switching from general to sector budget support, 
again without coordinating this move with other European donors. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
So far, we have seen that the controversy around the provision of GBS has caused a great 
heterogeneity of budget support policies among European donors, which in turn has led to 
severe coordination and harmonisation problems on the ground. On the one hand, for 
those in favour of increasing the weight of GBS, the aid effectiveness framework of the 
Paris Agenda provided the normative ground. Moreover, for proponents of budget 
support, the instrument has been perceived as an opportunity to improve the harmonisation 
among bilateral European aid strategies. On the other hand, those with more sceptical 
attitudes towards the instrument perceived budget support as a risky undertaking, with 
high fiduciary risks and as potentially strengthening authoritarian and neopatrimonial 
structures. Moreover, the instrument provided little visibility for donors in the case of 
successful development trajectories but bore the risk that donors could be held account-
able for any political fault of the budget support-receiving regime. 
Against this background, we contend that these arguments and preferences in favour and 
against the use GBS were not equally “distributed” amongst European governments and 
did not affect those governments’ behaviour randomly. Instead, we hypothesise that the 
varying donor preferences regarding the use of GBS were caused by particular charac-
teristics of the domestic context in European donor countries that systematically impacted 
on their budget support policy. In particular, we formulate three hypotheses: 
1)  The provision of budget support has been influenced by the ideological position of the 
donor government, with right-wing European governments disbursing less budget 
support. 
2)  The domestic economic context in donor countries has had an influence on budget 
support provision, with lower economic growth rates having a disproportional 
negative impact. 
                                                 
5  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmintdev/726/72605.htm. 
6  http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?a=63514&i=15258. 
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3)  The provision of budget support has been influenced by the structure of the existing 
aid system, with project-based aid bureaucracies tending to be more reluctant to use 
GBS. 
Ad 1) Party politics: Why should leftist governments be more supportive of budget 
support than conservative governments? Our answer to this question is that the 
constituency of right-wing governments is disproportionally sensitive to the entailed risks 
attached to the use of budget support (GBS). This argument is sustained by research on 
public opinion of European citizens towards development aid. Not only are citizens with 
more rightist political orientations less likely to support development aid in general 
(Lumsdaine 1993, 144, 153; Knack / Paxton 2011), which might be the reason why more 
conservative or right-wing governments are sometimes found to be more opposed to 
giving foreign aid than governments with other ideologies (e.g. Tingley 2010). 
Conservative constituencies are also more sceptical about the waste of foreign aid due to 
corruption in developing countries (Bauhr / Charron / Nasiritousi 2013) and thus more 
concerned about fiduciary risks. European citizens with more right-wing political 
orientations are also more likely to support interventionist forms of democracy promotion 
(Faust / Garcia 2014) and to condition the provision of foreign aid to the existence of 
democracy and “good” governance (Bodenstein / Faust forthcoming).  
Consequently, we expect more right-wing governments to be more likely to adopt aid 
policies that can demonstrate tangible results to their comparatively critical core consti-
tuencies. In addition, conservative governments also need to respond more strongly to 
concerns that aid does represent value for money and does not strengthen authoritarian or 
neopatrimonial structures in developing countries. Right-wing governments tend to be 
more supportive of aid interventions that allow them to make their contribution to 
economic and political modernisation in recipient countries measurable and visible to their 
home constituency. Moreover, this type of donor government tends to be more selective in 
allocating foreign aid, providing aid only to relatively well-governed countries or at least 
to be more likely to sanction visible corruption scandals and violations of democratic and 
human rights standards. These policy preferences regarding the delivery of foreign aid all 
do not match well with the intervention logic of budget support. 
Moreover, right-wing governments generally have a preference for development models 
where the private sector is the driving force of economic modernisation (see Boix 1997; 
Bartolotti et al. 2004). Thus, the use of GBS, which centres on a strong role of the state in 
providing public goods in the social sector, seems to be much more compatible with 
ideological positions that are located on the left of the political spectrum. Finally, political 
parties on the (extreme) right in many European countries have stronger nationalist 
positions and are on average more sceptical regarding multilateral institutions (Addison / 
McGillivray / Odedokun 2004). Accordingly, they should be more reserved in supporting 
joint financing mechanisms such as GBS. 
For these reasons, we expect right-wing donor governments to be more reluctant to use 
budget support, however this is not to say that the potential risks of budget support are of 
no concern to governments with other ideological positions. These factors are important 
for explaining why GBS has never become the dominant European aid instrument. Still, 
for the reasons mentioned above, we expect that the ideological composition of a donor 
government does have a marginal effect on its preference regarding the use of GBS. 
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Ad2) Economic context: Why should the economic context in a donor country have an 
impact on the use of GBS? For similar reasons as those mentioned above, we expect a 
positive relation between the overall macroeconomic context – measured by economic 
growth – and the use of budget support. Most importantly we hypothesise that deterio-
rating growth rates have a negative impact on the use of GBS. In times of economic 
hardship, donor governments are particularly incentivised to demonstrate that their foreign 
aid achieves tangible results (see e.g. Dang / Knack / Rogers 2009) and does not disappear 
into the pockets of corrupt elites or be used for sustaining repressive authoritarian regimes. 
For this purpose, again, traditional projects are better suited than GBS, as they are better 
suited to correspond to a donor’s desire for visible aid delivery (see Martens 2005). In 
addition, providing budgetary aid to other countries in times of austerity and severe budget 
constraints at home is likely to face public scepticism and discontent. Accordingly, one 
would expect donor governments to become more risk averse in times of economic crisis 
and therefore more reluctant to spend GBS compared to other aid modalities. 
Ad 3): Structure of the donor country’s aid system: This provision of budget support 
breaks with the traditional way of delivering aid characterised by clearly identifiable, 
earmarked financial and technical projects. The delivery of foreign aid through GBS 
diminishes the manoeuvring space of implementing agencies by forcing them to harmonise 
their aid interventions among each other. An increase in budget support provision thus 
threatens bureaucratic structures which are heavily based on traditional project-based aid 
delivery (see e.g. Nuscheler 2008). Budget support also requires aid interventions to be 
aligned according to the developmental preferences and the administrative procedures of the 
recipient country and aims at strengthening a developing country’s own institutions and 
administrative systems. GBS can therefore be perceived as a threat to the bureaucratic 
interests of aid agencies that rely on a business-model related to the provision of (small-scale) 
projects and the sending and employment of technical experts from donor countries. 
Aid agencies in general have been found to adapt only slowly, with strong internal 
interests considered as obstacles to change (Easterly 2007). The management of budget 
support does require different core competencies from aid bureaucrats and thus a process 
of adaptation and change. While sector-specific technical expertise is still needed, the 
primordial expertise of aid managers for managing budget support consists in their ability to 
successfully participate in policy and political dialogues that attempt to build the economic 
and political macro-frameworks for successful and sustainable development. This changing 
role of a successful aid manager can easily provoke resistance from traditional experts 
working in the field of foreign aid. 
On the one hand, probably every European donor administration will face at least some 
resistance and obstacles to change of this kind. On the other hand, the organisation of aid 
systems in European countries is heterogeneous regarding the existence of specialised aid 
agencies, their political influence, as well as their reliance on traditional modes of delivery. 
Accordingly, we expect European governments to provide less budget support if their 
institutional set-up for managing foreign aid is characterised by comparatively influential 
implementing aid agencies that rely on modes of delivery unfavourable to the intervention 
logic of GBS. 
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3 Empirical inquiry  
3.1 Cross-country evidence from Europe 
In a first step, we approached our hypotheses on the impact of domestic politics on the 
provision of budget support with econometric methods. For this purpose, we examined the 
impact of domestic factors in 15 European donor countries on the varying amounts of their 
budget support disbursements in the 2002–2012 period.7 
Dependent variable: To obtain a normalised distribution, we used the annual amount of 
budget support disbursements transformed into logarithmic values as one dependent 
variable for the 2002–2012 period. For the same period, we also took the proportion of 
budget support disbursements against the total amount of country programmable aid as the 
dependent variables for our inquiry. This choice was justified for two reasons: Following 
our main argument, the coordination problems among European donor governments at 
least partly stem from their respective domestic political environment, independent of 
developments in recipient countries. This expectation is sustained by recipient country 
analysis, where individual donors, in the exact same country situation, differed regarding 
their budget support disbursements, the dependent variable for our inquiry.8 
Independent variables: We build a parsimonious model for explaining the variance of 
budget support disbursements. This is due to the short time span under consideration, and 
the fact that many potential economic or political factors of influence have remained 
(almost) constant over time. Moreover, as we mostly include country fixed effects to 
control for omitted variable bias, the between-country-variance tends to be fully absorbed 
by the country dummies. Thus, we include only independent variables in our analysis that 
reveal major changes during the 2002–2012 period. 
                                                 
7  We obtained data on general budget support disbursements for the 2002–2012 period from 17 European 
donors from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD’s Development Cooperation 
Directorate (DCD-DAC). From this sample we excluded Greece and Luxemburg because of the limited 
amount of observations (four and two respectively) for the period under consideration. Given that the 
DAC statistics regarding GBS disbursements do not differ between 0 disbursements and missing 
values, we coded observations as 0 if no GBS disbursements had been made before (overall 10 
observations). In other cases of missing values we obtained data through simple interpolation (5 
observations). Thus we obtained a balanced panel with 165 observations. As a robustness check, we 
also performed the regressions without these 15 observations, the results showing no major differences 
to those reported in the subsequent table. Moreover, as DAC data only clearly differentiate between 
sector budget support and general budget support since 2010, we were not able to use this 
differentiation for our econometric analysis. 
8  Some authors favour data on aid commitments over the use of aid disbursements because commitment 
data are better available for longer time periods and might better reflect the actual preferences of a 
donor government. However, for our relatively short time period, there is only a slight difference in the 
availability of commitment and disbursement data. More importantly, however, we would argue that 
disbursement data are better suited to analysing the particular instrument of budget support. In contrast 
to project aid, budget support gives donor governments a much higher degree of flexibility for 
augmenting or reducing their disbursement so that changes in budget support disbursements are likely 
to reflect the immediate consequences of a changing domestic context in the donor country. Still, in the 
Appendix we also provide the results from regression analysis using data on budget support 
commitments. As is show, the results are highly similar to those of Table 1. 
Jörg Faust / Svea Koch 
14 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Most importantly, we examine the impact of the ideological composition of European 
governments with two different variables. As explained, we expect right-wing govern-
ments to be more reluctant to provide GBS. Accordingly, we include a variable that 
measures the number of parliamentarians who belong to a right-wing government party as 
a percentage of the overall number of parliamentarians (RightWingGovParl). Given the 
huge amount of coalition governments in Europe and the fact that all European govern-
ments are based on parliamentary or semi-parliamentary systems, this variable is more 
adequate to capture the ideological position of a government than by simply taking the 
party affiliation of the head of government into account. We obtained the necessary data to 
construct this variable from the World Bank data set on political institutions (Beck et al. 
2001). Moreover, we built a more nuanced variable of a government’s ideological position 
by using data from the Party Manifesto project (Volkens et al. 2012; Budge 2000). From 
these data, we construct a variable, where higher values indicate a more leftist position of 
government and then take the logarithm of the variable (Government-Left) in order to 
normalise its distribution.9 As can be observed in Figure 2, the average values of both 
variables depict a similar trend, particularly regarding the trend towards more conservative 
governments since 2007.10 
In addition, we also include a variable for the intensity of a political system’s “checks and 
balances” approximated by the number of veto-players (Tsebelis 2002), which is 
measured by the variable “Checks” from the World Bank Data Set on Political Institutions 
(Beck et al. 2001). 
To measure the impact of donor countries’ economic performance, we include (the natural 
logarithm of) GDP per capita to examine whether changes in per capita income have had 
an effect on the provision of GBS. Here, our expectation is that, particularly against the 
background of the European economic crisis, governments could easily be tempted to 
disproportionally cut GBS because this form of foreign aid is easier to suspend than 
project aid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  The Party Manifesto project codes party manifestos for every political party in a given country on 
several policy dimensions and positions political parties on a left-right scale, ranging from -100 
(extreme left) to 100 (extreme right). We weight the importance of a government party by taking into 
account its position on the left-right scale and the percentage of its parliamentarians against the overall 
number of parliamentarians. Hereafter, we transform the variable into positive values so that greater 
values indicate a more leftist position. 
10  Note that numbers in Figure 2 depict the average ideology of governments in our European sample in a 
given year and therefore show only gradual variation. In contrast, this variation at individual country 
level has often been much stronger when there have been changes in the composition of governments. 
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In order to investigate the extent to which a donor country’s aid system might have 
influenced its provision of budget support, we build a time-invariant variable from a 2009 
OECD report that describes the basic organisational characteristic of European foreign aid 
providers (OECD 2008). Remember that we expect donor countries with a project-focused 
set-up to be more resistant to providing higher levels of budget support because of vested 
bureaucratic interests and resistance. Likewise, donor countries without such a structural 
feature are likely to have found it appealing to disburse large sums of foreign aid via 
budget support. The OECD report’s information enabled us to identify to which extent the 
aid systems of our sample countries were characterised by state-owned implementing aid 
agencies. Similar to previous studies (Fuchs / Dreher / Nunnenkamp 2014), we therefore 
constructed a dummy variable that took the value of 1 if there was a state-owned 
implementing agency outside the ministry responsible for development cooperation. 
Seven countries of our sample had such an agency: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Norway, Spain and Sweden. We also built a more nuanced variable on a 1-4 scale: 4 being 
a country with more than one implementing agency outside the ministry responsible for 
development cooperation (e.g. Germany, Norway); 3 being a country with one 
implementing agency outside the respective ministry (e.g. Austria, Belgium); 2 being a 
country with an implementing agency incorporated into the ministry; and 1 having no 
implementing agency during our period of investigation (e.g. Finland, the United 
Kingdom).11 
                                                 
11  As information from other studies (Fuchs / Dreher / Nunnenkamp 2014) as well as from a 1998 OECD 
report reveals, these variables did not change over our period of investigation. Thus we are confident 
Figure 2: Average ideological composition across 15 European donor governments, 2002–2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Own compilation based on data from Party Manifesto 
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As one can expect that donor countries that spend more on foreign aid will also provide 
higher sums of budget support, we controlled for the effect of the overall amount of 
country programmable aid (ln): In contrast to overall aid flows, country programmable 
aid captures the flows of aid that go to the partner countries and over which recipient 
countries have a significant say. Overall aid flows include debt relief, humanitarian aid, 
and in-donor-country-costs such as administrative costs and resources spent on refugees 
and students from developing countries and inflate aid that is available in developing 
countries. Including this variable is important because it identifies the effect of changing 
overall aid to developing countries on the use of budget support. 
Estimation technique: To identify the effect of the independent variables on budget 
support disbursements in our balanced panel with 165 observations, (T=11, N=15), we use 
the standard OLS (ordinary least squares) procedure with panel corrected standard errors 
(Beck / Katz 1995; 1996). We prefer the Prais Winsten Transformation over the use of the 
lagged dependent variable. The reason for this choice is that “the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable and/or period dummies tends not only to absorb large parts of the trend 
in the dependent variable, but likely biases estimates” if there are reasons to believe that 
the explanatory variables can explain a major part of the existing trend of the dependent 
variable (Plümper / Tröger / Manow 2005, 349). Still, we include a dummy variable for 
the 2007-2012 period in order to control for a potential trend effect due to the European 
economic crisis or a trend towards more conservative governments. Finally, we include 
country dummies in order to avoid omitted variable bias and to identify the importance of 
contextual, time invariant country factors. 12 
As Table 1 reveals, Models 1 and 2 provide substantial support for our hypotheses. Firstly, 
a change towards a more conservative government composition has had a negative and 
exponential impact on the total amount of budget support disbursements. According to the 
results of Model 1, a one-unit increase of the variable leads on average to a 0.9 % decrease 
in budget support disbursement; an increase by 50 units has on average provoked a 56% 
decrease in budget support disbursements. In other words, a change in government from a 
situation with no right wing parliamentarians in government to a situation where right 
wing parliamentarians in government represent 50% of overall parliamentarians has been 
associated with a reduction of budget support disbursement by 56%.13 Moreover, Model 1 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
that using these variables captures an important part of the structural differences of the donors’ aid 
systems and that our analysis is not confronted with a reverse causality problem. 
12  Against our theoretical background, including country dummies is sufficient to deal with potential 
problems of endogeneity. We find no plausible reasons for a reverse causality problem as neither a 
government’s ideology nor its economic domestic context should be influenced by the amount of 
budget support disbursements. 
13  We find a smaller, albeit still substantial, effect when using our alternative variable for government 
ideology with data from the Party Manifesto project. As both the dependent and the independent 
variable have been log transformed, the effect should be interpreted as an elasticity. Remember that our 
ideology scale has ranged from 0 to 70, higher values meaning more left-wing orientation of 
government. Accordingly, a 10% change in our transformed Party Manifesto indicator towards the 
political left increases the budget support provision by approximately 3% (1.10^.33=1.03). A 100% 
increase, for instance moving from a value of 30 to a value of 60 on our scale, increases the amount of 
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depicts that there has been a statistically significant influence of a government’s 
ideological position; the veto-player variable has had no such impact. 
Secondly, the macroeconomic context has also had a significant impact on the provision 
of budget support. These findings show that many European governments have reduced 
budget support disbursements in times of economic crisis. While overall aid goes down as 
well, budget support decreases disproportionally. Against the fact that GDP per capita 
growth rates have roughly ranged between -8 and 3% in the period under observation, the 
effect of the variable again seems plausible: a one percentage decline of GDP per capita 
provoked a decline of GBS disbursements by approximately 5%. Not very surprisingly, 
the CPA variable has a positive sign and is also statistically significant, meaning that an 
increase in country programmable aid has been associated with an increase in budget 
support disbursements. 
In Model 2, the dependent variable is the percentage of budget support disbursements 
against overall CPA. As Model 2 shows, both variables measuring the ideological position 
of the government are again highly significant and have the expected sign. The same holds 
for the domestic economic context as proxied by GDP per capita. The size of the 
coefficients also points to a substantial effect of government ideology and the domestic 
economic context when the relative weight of budget support is concerned. For instance, 
an increase in one unit of the government composition towards the right has led to an 
average decrease of approximately 0.025 of the share of budget support disbursements. An 
increase by 50 units – (here 50%) – would have meant a decrease by 1.25%, which is still 
substantial considering that the average share of budget support was only about 5.5%. In 
contrast to Model 1, the variable measuring the overall amount of CPA lost its significance. 
Accordingly, whether a country gives more or less foreign aid has had no statistically 
significant impact on the percentage of budget support it provided. 
Hereafter, we tested whether our identified effects were truly specific to the provision of 
budget support and not to the overall provision of foreign aid. We used the amount of 
CPA disbursements (in logarithmic values) as the dependent variable. As Model 3 depicts, 
the overall amount of country programmable aid has not been affected in a similar way by 
the independent variables as budget support disbursements have. First, the impact of the 
ideological variables was no longer robust. The percentage of right-wing parliamentarians 
in government was still slightly significant but the size of the coefficient had decreased 
substantially. Yet, the Party Manifesto-related variable was far from being statistically 
significant and had even changed its sign. Regarding the economic context, the GDP per 
capita change within in a country – while being statistically significant – had a smaller 
effect on overall CPA than on the disbursement of budget support. Overall, the 
comparison of Models 2 and 3 therefore show that partisan politics and the economic 
context had a stronger impact on the contested aid instrument of budget support than on 
the overall disbursements of foreign aid. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
budget support by 27%, while a 600% increase, such as a move from 10 to 60, would have implied an 
increase of budget support disbursements by 84%. 
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The significance of many of the unit fixed effects in Models 1–3 reveals the existence of 
contextual factors at the country level affecting budget support disbursement. For instance, 
the two non-EU donors, Norway and Switzerland, reveal disproportionally low budget 
support disbursements. Moreover, the country coefficients of Germany and the United 
Kingdom suggest that the two major European bilateral donors differed substantially in 
their country context. 
We then turn to the question of whether the contextual factors are related to our third 
hypothesis about the negative impact of implementing agencies on budget support 
provision. To answer this question, Models 4 and 5 again use the proportion of budget 
support disbursements as a percentage of overall CPA but abstain from using country 
dummies. Instead, the latter are replaced with two time-invariant variables. Most impor-
tantly, we introduce the variable(s) measuring the existence of implementing agencies. As 
further controls, we use the number of former colonies of donor countries (in logarithmic 
terms) and differentiate between the two non-EU member countries and the rest of the 
sample. While we recognise that leaving out unit-fixed effects and substituting them for a 
selected number of time-invariant variables can potentially cause an omitted variable bias 
problem, the result still provides substantial support to our hypothesis. As Models 4 and 5 
show, both proxy variables for differentiating between the relevance of implementing 
agencies across European donors have a negative sign and are highly significant. 
Accordingly, aid systems characterised by implementing agencies tended to provide less 
budget support. Moreover, European donors with more former colonies have tended to 
provide more budget support, while the two non-EU members seemed to provide 
disproportionally less than EU member states. 
 
Table 1: Domestic drivers of budget support disbursements 
 Model 1 
BS (absolute) 
Model 2 
BS (% CPA) 
Model 3 
CPA (absolute) 
Model 4 
BS (% CPA) 
Model 5 
BS (% CPA) 
 FE FE FE Agency 1/4 Agency 0/1 
RightWingGovParl -.0092*** 
(.003) 
-.025** 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.14) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0,03** 
(0.01) 
GDP  
per capita (ln) 
4.95** 
(2.56) 
15.55** 
(6.27) 
1.20** 
(.59) 
17.48*** 
(4.29) 
18.77*** 
(4.39) 
CPA (ln) .57** 
(.27) 
-.35 
(.49) 
 .74* 
(.42) 
.47 
(.38) 
Checks .17 
(.14) 
-.18 
(.36) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.004 
(.354) 
-.077 
(.35) 
2007–2012 .10 
(.24) 
.05 
(.54) 
.00 
(.06) 
-.138 
(.538) 
.17 
(.55) 
Agency 1/4  
 
  1.46*** 
(.45) 
 
Agency 0/1  
 
   -3.13*** 
(1.01) 
Non EU Country    -2.94** 
(1.37) 
-3.50*** 
(1.27) 
Number of  
colonies (ln) 
 
 
  .911* 
(.48) 
1.27*** 
(.50) 
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Continued table 1:  Domestic drivers of budget support disbursements 
Austria  -2.61*** 
(.70) 
-7.7*** 
(1.5) 
-2.29*** 
(.22) 
  
Belgium -1.97*** 
( .62) 
-6.41** 
(1.29) 
-1.01*** 
(.09) 
  
Denmark  -1.11* 
( .57) 
-3.60*** 
(.84) 
-.07 
(.07) 
  
Finland  -.60 
(.48) 
-1.52 
(1.14) 
-1.41*** 
(.08) 
  
France  1.20** 
(.53) 
2.32 
(2.22) 
1.26*** 
(.13) 
  
Germany  -1.27** 
(.62) 
-5.27*** 
(1.04) 
1.13*** 
( .09) 
  
Ireland  -1.43** 
(.55) 
-2.29 
(1.51) 
-1.73*** 
(.14) 
  
Italy -.49 
(.75) 
-2.58 
(2.03) 
-.71*** 
(.17) 
  
Netherlands -.35 
(.30) 
.58 
(1.74) 
.12 
(.14) 
  
Norway -1.88** 
(.91) 
-5.85** 
(2.39) 
-.35 
(.23) 
  
Portugal -.04 
(1.21) 
-1.03 
(3.06) 
-1.14*** 
(.31) 
  
Spain -1.48** 
(.63) 
-4.28*** 
(1.38) 
.14 
(.28) 
  
Switzerland -1.30** 
(.54) 
-6.38*** 
(1.68) 
-.69*** 
(.14) 
  
United Kingdom 1.17*** 
(.37) 
6.45*** 
(1.73) 
.88*** 
(.11) 
  
Constant -51.53* 
(26.55) 
-149.73* 
(64.90) 
-4.4 
(6.12) 
  
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 
R2 .65*** .56*** .95*** .27*** .32*** 
Wald Chi2 2194*** 423*** 37149*** 47.62*** 53.7*** 
Government Left .34** 
(.15) 
.67*** 
(.23) 
-.005 
(.016) 
.63** 
(.27) 
.71*** 
(.25) 
OLS with panel corrected standard errors and Prais Winsten Transformation 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source:  Authors 
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3.2 Comparing Germany and the United Kingdom  
3.2.1 Case selection  
To trace the impact of partisan politics on the provision of GBS, and to better understand 
the impact of the institutional set-up of a donor country’s foreign aid system on its 
preferences for budget support, we provide qualitative evidence examining the cases of 
Germany and the United Kingdom – Europe’s largest bilateral donors. Choosing these two 
countries seems to be appropriate for a between-country-comparison as well as for a 
within-country-comparison: both can be closely related to our statistical analysis, where 
we revealed significant within-country-effects of variables such as government ideology 
and GDP per capita but also important between-country-effects through the inclusion of 
unit fixed effects. 
Regarding the between-country analysis, there is a huge difference in the amount of 
budget support disbursements between the two countries over the entire period of 
investigation. While the UK evolved as Europe’s most important bilateral provider of 
budget support, Germany remained much more reluctant in channelling its aid resources 
via the instrument. As can be seen from Table 1, the average percentage of UK budget 
support was around 15% and peaked at a maximum of 20%, while in the case of Germany, 
budget disbursements were far below and never exceeded 5% of total CPA. Our regression 
analysis sustains this difference. As is depicted in Table 1, Models 1 and 2 show highly 
significant and positive coefficients for the UK country dummy variable, while the 
coefficients for Germany are highly significant and have a negative sign. This suggests 
that time invariant factors such as structural differences in their aid system might have 
influenced the budget support policies of these countries. A comparison of both countries’ 
policy structures in development cooperation is thus likely to reveal different incentive 
schemes that have impacted on their governments’ choices causing them to use the 
instrument to such different degrees. 
Besides these “time invariant” differences between the two countries, there is also within-
country variance regarding budget support disbursements in both countries. Within both 
countries, we can observe changes during the investigation period regarding the use of 
budget support. Given that there were changes in the government composition and the 
domestic economic context, this within-country variance of budget support disbursements 
allows the impact of partisan politics and the economic context within each country to be 
traced. 
3.2.2 Between-country comparison: The aid system in Germany and the United 
Kingdom 
While Germany and the UK are Europe’s largest bilateral donor countries, each having an 
independent Ministry of Development Cooperation, the aid systems in both countries 
nevertheless show some significant differences that have hindered or promoted the 
provision of budget support. 
In the United Kingdom, the institutional set-up has changed back and forth over the last 
decades with the Department for International Development (DFID) and its predecessors 
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either being independent departments or part of the foreign office.14 Re-established as an 
independent department for development in 1997, DFID issued two influential White 
Papers in 1997 and 2000, making poverty reduction the overriding aim of the UK’s 
international development policy. In 2002, the International Development Act was passed, 
enshrining the reduction of poverty as the single purpose of development aid in British 
law (Solesbury 2003; Barder 2005). In addition, the amount of ODA spent by the British 
government increased rapidly since the late 1990s. While the percentage of British ODA 
to GDP was below 2.5% before 2000, it increased to almost 0.7% in 2013. In absolute 
terms, bilateral ODA increased from USD 2.8 to 8.7 billion (constant 2012 prices) during 
the 1998-2012 period, while overall British aid increased from 5 to 14 billion in the same 
period. Moreover, DFID established itself as a global leader on development issues, and 
was at the forefront of promoting aid effectiveness principles. In this context, DFID was 
among the most progressive European donors to promote a “somewhat radical move away 
from funding development projects in poor countries towards the direct financing of 
national development and poverty reduction programmes” (Porteous 2005, 283).  
In line with the increase of DFID’s increasing political and financial weight, the 
organisation drafted a very progressive budget support policy in 2004, stating that budget 
support would become the department’s preferred aid modality. In doing so, DFID faced 
comparably little resistance from interest groups within the UK or other departments. One 
reason for this development was the relative autonomy of DFID over its policies and 
budget and little resistance against this policy shift. As the British aid system does not 
have public implementing agencies, the lobby for project-driven aid delivery was 
comparatively weak, even more so since the 2002 International Development Act reduced 
the role of the private sector and formally abolished tied aid (Barder 2005). 
The structure and approach of the UK’s NGOs are also heavily influenced by DFID, 
which changed its funding structure for NGOs in the early 2000s. In the following, new 
funding criteria required a stronger focus on advocacy and rights-based approaches, away 
from the traditional service-delivery role of NGOs. These funding criteria are in line with 
DFID’s change under Labour from using NGOs as an implementer of development aid to 
a stronger focus on government-to-government aid, such as budget support (Wallace 
2003). Moreover, there are many large advocacy and campaign-oriented international 
NGOs based in the UK which subscribed to the aid effectiveness agenda and supported 
the idea of programme-based approaches and budget support, also because this did not 
undermine their own business model. DFID thus faced comparably little domestic 
resistance when implementing its budget support policy in 2004. In combination, the 
absence of implementing aid agencies and the sharp increase in bilateral ODA also 
increased the disbursement pressure within DFID, making budget support a highly 
attractive aid instrument for disbursing large amounts of aid. 
                                                 
14  From 1979 until 1997, the UK was governed by a conservative government, with the then Overseas 
Development Administration being part of the Foreign Office. In 1997, the Labour Party re-established 
DFID as an independent department, following a party report, which recommended not only the 
creation of a separate government department but also less emphasis on commercial and strategic 
motivations in providing foreign aid and a stronger focus on poverty reduction (Barder 2005). 
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The German aid system strongly differed from the situation in the UK. Germany has had 
an independent development ministry since the foundation of the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in 1961. Despite this longer history of an 
independent ministry, interest groups within the aid system have played a much stronger 
role in shaping German development policy. Most importantly, Germany has very strong 
public implementing agencies, both for technical and financial development assistance. In 
our period of investigation, Germany had three different organisations for technical 
cooperation, among them the world’s largest bilateral provider of technical assistance, the 
Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).15 Beyond, Germany’s aid system is 
also characterised by a neo-corporatist system of project implementing NGOs, including 
the influential political foundations, NGOs linked to the churches, as well as many private 
NGOs organised under the umbrella association of VENRO. The German aid system has 
been repeatedly criticised by OECD/ DAC Peer Reviews for its fragmented 
implementation structure, its tendency towards project proliferation and for imposing a 
high amount of transaction costs on developing countries (OECD / DAC 2005; 2010). 
Among Germany’s state owned implementing agencies, only the financial cooperation 
agency KfW Development Bank became more supportive to budget support, not least 
because its provision – technically channelled through the KfW – strengthened the 
organisation’s profile vis-à-vis partner country governments and technical cooperation. 
The opposite was true for the GTZ, which saw its interests and profile threatened by 
potentially increasing amounts of budget support and strongly lobbied against this aid 
instrument from the beginning (Nuscheler 2008). Budget support also ran counter to the 
interests of most German NGOs, which also relied on a small project-based aid delivery 
model and were often heavily subsidised by official ODA funds (Dreher et al. 2012). 
Overall, BMZ was confronted with a rather strong opposition against a substantial increase 
in budget support by most state-owned implementing agencies and by NGOs embedded in a 
neo-corporatist structure. At the same time, the German ministry did not face similar 
disbursement pressure as in the case of the UK because it was not confronted by a similar 
rise in ODA. In addition, Germany’s implementing agencies employ a substantial number of 
aid workers, creating incentives to continue channelling ODA through projects.16  
Overall, the between-country comparison of Germany and the UK thus reveals the impact 
of the different institutional set-ups and the interests of particular actors in the aid system 
that have led to a more or less favourable environment for the provision of budget support. 
                                                 
15  In 2011, the three technical assistance organisations GTZ, DED (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst) and 
InWEnt (Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung) were merged to one single aid agency – the 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).  
16  Absolute German ODA increased from USD 7.3 to 12.9 billion (in 2012 constant prices), while bilateral 
German ODA increased from 4.6 to 8.6 in the 1998–2012 period. Moreover an OECD report from 2008 
reveals that Germany employed more than twice as many aid workers in its public aid system than the 
UK (4479 vs. 1828), even if excluding the huge amount of local staff members in technical cooperation 
projects. 
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3.2.3 Within-country comparison: party politics and the economic context 
Despite these time invariant differences between the two countries, the variables of our 
statistical analysis have an impact on both countries, meaning that we should be able to 
trace the same political dynamics with regards to GBS policy. This is especially true with 
regard to party politics, where a change in government had an impact on the budget support 
policy in both country cases. In both, Germany and the UK, a conservative government or 
conservative-dominated coalition was more sceptical and reluctant to provide budget 
support than left-wing governments or coalitions. 
In the UK, the former labour government was in power when budget support started to 
emerge at the end of the 1990s. When DFID drafted its first budget support policy in 
2004, which stated that GBS would become the department’s preferred aid modality, the 
policy faced little party-political resistance. Budget support was also in line with Labour’s 
new direction for development policy, which supported a stronger focus on poverty reduction, 
institution-building and programme-based approaches. The Parliament, as in other European 
countries, remained sceptical and requested reassurance from DFID that budget support 
would not be misused for unintended purposes such as military spending and defence. 
DFID, however, remained firm and put a lot of effort into convincing MPs that the 
benefits of GBS outweigh potential risks (Warrener 2004).  
The major turn in DFID’s budget support policy took place under the Tory (centre-right) 
government, which came to power in 2010. Already in its Green Paper “One World 
Conservatism”, published ahead of the elections, the Tories distanced themselves from the 
Labour Party’s approach to budget support by stating that “we will not be as willing as 
Labour have been to give the benefit of the doubt to governments where we are not 
completely clear about the probity of the audit and accountability systems” (Conser-
vatives 2009, 17). Subsequently, in 2011, the new Tory government announced that it 
would halve budget support operations by 2015 and that, in the future, sector budget 
support would be preferred over GBS. Sector budget support seems to be more in line 
with the government’s focus on results in social sectors and value for money, whereas the 
previous government strongly focused on macro-political reforms and institution-building. 
In Germany, a left (social democrat-green government) was in place between 2002 and 
2005. This left-wing coalition was generally in favour of budget support and started to 
promote the instrument at the beginning of the 2000s. The domestic interest conflicts 
outlined above, however, led to a rather moderate use of the instrument despite a 
government coalition that was generally supportive of budget support. Hereafter, from 
2005 to 2009, Germany was governed by a coalition of social democrats (SPD) and 
conservative (CDU/CSU) parties. Even though the Development Ministry remained in the 
hands of the SPD, the CDU had won a larger share of the votes and thus the right to the 
Chancellor’s position. In the following months, the overall budget support policy changed 
gradually. The Coalition Treaty provided for the use of budget support in well-governed 
developing countries and the Development Minister, Ms Wieczorek-Zeul, also planned to 
increase its use. There was, however, strong scepticism in both the Finance Ministry and 
the Budget Committee, where representatives of the right-wing coalition parties had a 
majority. In 2007, the Budget Committee commissioned a report to the Auditor General. 
The report did not question the instrument as such but highlighted the high fiduciary risks 
and recommended a strict and careful use along with a case-by-case assessment of every 
Jörg Faust / Svea Koch 
24 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
budget support provision by the Budget Committee. Since 2008, every budget support 
operation has thus been subjected to the approval of the Budget Committee, which used its 
veto power for instance in 2009, when the ministry proposed budget support to Benin 
(Hermle / Hauschild 2012). Debates in the German Parliament also revealed that the 
Liberals (FDP) were lobbying heavily against budget support, whereas the conservative 
CDU confirmed that they were critical but not fully reluctant towards budget support, 
provided that it was granted to only a few selected good performers.17  
In 2010, a new, right-wing coalition came to power (CDU/CSU/ FDP) and changed the 
existing approach to budget support radically (Hermle / Hauschild 2012). The now FDP-
led Development Ministry announced that no new budget support operation would be 
established in that legislative period and some of the former recipients saw a reallocation 
from budget support to other aid modalities. The FDP Development Minister publicly de-
clared that his party considered the very idea of budget support as flawed and the wrong 
approach in development policy.18 In sum, party and ideological composition of the 
German government had a strong impact the country’s budget support policy throughout 
the three legislative periods under scrutiny. Even though Germany was from the beginning 
a rather moderate provider, average disbursements decreased significantly under the right-
wing coalition. In both cases, the UK and Germany, party politics and the ideological 
composition of the government had a strong influence on budget support provision. 
Figure 3: Overview within case comparison 
Germany: 
2002–2005   2006–2009:   2010–2013:  
centre-left government  great coalition   centre-right government 
Increasing support for BS Constraints for use of BS Gradual exit-strategy regarding BS 
United Kingdom:   
2002–2009    2010–2013 
Left/Labour    Conservative /Tories & Liberals (2010–13) 
Strong support for BS   More reluctant towards BS  
Source:  Authors 
4 Conclusions 
This paper has aimed at analysing the domestic politics behind the heterogeneity of budget 
support provision in European countries. From an aid effectiveness perspective, budget 
support provided a number of in-built characteristics to implement the aid effectiveness 
principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. Moreover, the 
intervention logic of budget support is conducive to increasing the coordination among 
European donors and also provides a framework for including the normative aspirations of 
                                                 
17  dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/125/1612512.pdf .  
18  http://www.fr-online.de/aegypten-syrien-revolution/dirk-niebel--wir-halten-allgemeine-budgethilfe-
fuer-falsch-,7151782,7177718.html. 
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European donors to strengthen transparent and accountable state structures. In principle, 
budget support could therefore have contributed to a more coherent and harmonised 
European development policy. 
On the other hand, these expected benefits of budget support never fully materialised, at 
least partly because donors only reluctantly engaged in its provision. Despite being suited 
to make aid more effective, budget support bears high political risks for donor govern-
ments, and has, from the beginning, been a highly contested aid modality. The political 
risks associated with the use of budget support have been handled differently by European 
donor countries, which has led to a large variety in budget support policies causing harmonisa-
tion problems on the ground despite the original purpose of using budget support as a driver 
of improved donor harmonisation. We placed our analysis in the context of the sluggish 
implementation of the Paris Agenda (see Wood et al. 2011) and expected the reasons for the 
rather moderate use of budget support to be found in the domestic political context of donor 
countries. 
As we have demonstrated in our quantitative and qualitative analysis, the different pre-
ferences for the use of budget support were not randomly distributed among European 
donor governments but were heavily influence by their political economy. The political 
economy factors relate to the differences in the ideological composition of governments, 
varying domestic economic contexts, and the structure of the existing aid system. As those 
features vary strongly within and between European donor countries, they present serious 
barriers to implementing the aid effectiveness principles and to harmonising aid practices 
in a decentralised way. Against the evidence presented in our paper, it seems highly 
questionable whether progress regarding the implementation of the aid effectiveness 
principles can be made without acknowledging the domestic political context and interests 
in donor countries. It also seems highly questionable whether Europeans will be able to 
harmonise their development policies in a decentralised manner. In order to increase 
Europe’s collective action capacity towards the developing world, serious progress towards 
more binding coordination mechanisms is essential. In the case of budget support, or what 
remains of it, delegating more policy and coordination competences to the European Com-
mission to manage a truly European approach to the instrument needs to be the way forward. 
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Table A1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable name Variable definition n Mean Standard 
deviation  
Min. Max. 
Budget support 
disbursement (ln) 
Amount of Budget Support (ln) 
disbursed by a single donor in the 
given year according to data from 
the Creditor Reporting System of 
the OECD /DAC 
165 3.52 1.75 0 6.50 
RightWingGovParl Amount of government parlia-
mentarians that belong to a right-
wing political party according to 
the data from the Database of 
Political Institutions 
165 .27  .22 0 .67 
Government-Left 
(ln) 
Ideological position of a govern-
ment on a left-right scale accor-
ding to data from the Party Mani-
festo project 
165 3.44 .77 -.123 4.27 
GDP per capita (ln) Gross domestic product per capita 
in purchasing power parity (ln). 
Data obtained from the World 
Development Indicators 
165 10.34 .174 9.95 10.85 
Country 
programmable aid 
(CPA) (ln) 
Country programmable aid (ln) 
disbursed by a single donor in the 
given year according to data from 
the Creditor Reporting System of 
the OECD /DAC 
165 
 
6.83  1.04 4.43 8.59 
Checks  Number of veto-players in a politi-
cal system according to the data 
from the Database of Political 
Institutions 
165 4.20 1.07  2 7 
Agency Existence of a state-owned imple-
menting agency outside the 
ministry responsible for foreign aid
165 .53 .5 01 1 
Agency 4/1 Ranking of state-owned imple-
menting agencies, differentiating 
between agencies within and 
outside the ministry responsible 
for foreign aid 
165 2.47  1.03 1 4 
Agency 0/1 Existence of a state-owned imple-
menting agency 
165 .47 .50 0 1 
Number of colonies Number of colonies a donor country 
had in the past 
165 .76 11.80 39 0 
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Table A2: Agency variables and number of staff working at headquarters and as expatriates in  
 developing countries (2007) 
Agency 4to1 Agency 0 / 1 
Austria 3 1 
Belgium 3 1 
Denmark 2 0 
Finland 1 0 
France 3 1 
Germany 4 1 
Ireland 2 0 
Italy 1 0 
Netherlands 2 0 
Norway 4 1 
Portugal 2 0 
Spain 3 1 
Sweden 4 1 
Switzerland 2 0 
United Kingdom 1 0 
 
Table A3: Robustness check: domestic factors and GBS commitments 
 Model 6 
BS (absolute ln) 
Model 7 
BS (% CPA) 
Model 8 
BS (% CPA) 
Model 9 
BS (% CPA) 
 FE Model FE Model Agency 1/0 Agency 1/4 
RightWingGovParl -.015*** 
.006 
-.06** 
0.03 
-.064** 
0.025 
-.065** 
0.026 
GDP per capita (ln) -1.39 
4.15 
-.08 
21.89 
20.07*** 
6.06 
19.11*** 
6.27 
Country programmable 
aid (CPA) (ln) 
1.44***  
.38 
1.89 
1.52 
1.35 
1.14 
1.62** 
1.23 
Checks -.20 
.22 
-1.49 
1.08 
-1.30 
.71* 
-1.25 
.73 
2007–2012 period -.23 
.24 
-1.62 
1.23 
-2.57* 
1.35 
-2.35* 
1.25 
Agency 1/4   
 
 -1.81** 
.09 
Agency 0/1   
 
-4.14*** 
1.62 
 
Non EU Country   
 
-4.80** 
2.39 
-4.00* 
2.35 
Number of colonies (ln)   
 
.12 
.09 
.09 
.08 
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Continued table A3: Robustness check: domestic factors and GBS commitments 
Austria  1.50 
1.49 
-1.09 
6.09 
  
Belgium -.03 
.91 
-5.86 
4.39 
  
Denmark  .60 
1.05 
-1.87 
5.08 
  
Finland  1.05 
1.04 
1.79 
5.45 
  
France  .70 
1.13 
-1.34 
6.22 
  
Germany  -.91 
1.01 
-7.85* 
4.74 
  
Ireland  1.65 
1.33 
1.31 
6.00 
  
Italy -.30 
1.27 
-5.76 
5.73 
  
Netherlands 1.25 
.90 
6.34 
5.02 
  
Norway 1.49 
1.71 
-.54 
9.13 
  
Portugal -.57 
2.01 
-7.10 
10.94 
  
Spain -2.01 
1.26 
-10.03* 
6.07 
  
Switzerland 1.01 
.96 
-3.76 
5.27 
  
United Kingdom .69 
.81 
4.47 
4.28 
  
Constant 8.94 
42.77 
5.79 
27.77 
  
Observations 184 184 184 184 
R2 .52 .33 .19 .17 
Government Left .31** 
.13 
.92* 
.59 
1.25* 
.69 
1.15* 
.63 
OLS with panel corrected standard errors and Prais Winsten Transformation 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source:  Authors 
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